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Routine Violations of
Medical Privacy in Article
81 Guardianship Cases.
So What or Now What?
By Joseph A. Rosenberg
Introduction
Each day in courtrooms throughout New York State, and indeed the United States, judges
are asked to decide whether to appoint a guardian for an alleged incapacitated person
(AIP) with the power to make decisions about the ALP's property management and per-
sonal needs.1 In New York, the standard for appointing a guardian under Article 81 of
the N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law (MHL) requires clear and convincing evidence of two main
elements: that a guardianship is necessary to provide for a person's personal needs and
property management, and the person either consents to the appointment or is found to
be incapacitated. 2 Medical evidence is not necessary to prove that a person is incapaci-
tated and needs a guardian. 3 Although medical information can be an important piece of
the guardianship "puzzle," it may be prejudicial and obscure the primary inquiry under
Article 81: what are the functional capacities of the person alleged to need a guardian, and
does the person have functional limitations that he or she does not fully understand or
appreciate, and as a result place the person at risk of harm?4
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that many, if not most,
guardianships are resolved in a generally decent man-
ner, with genuine care and concern for the person who
is alleged to be incapacitated and in need of a guardian.
However, the "loose use" of medical information creates
the risk that medical privacy rights are routinely violated.
This is not only a cause for concern in that unauthorized
disclosure of private health-related information is unlaw-
ful and damaging to a person, but it also may shift the
predominant frame of a guardianship from a functional
assessment to a medical diagnosis. Excessive reliance on
medical evidence can result in a court order that appoints
a guardian without a full exploration of less restrictive
alternatives that may be available and sufficient. Con-
sider the following scenarios:5
• Adult Protective Services (APS) filed a petition to
appoint a guardian for a single woman in her mid-80s,
based on an investigation conducted by an APS psychia-
trist. The petition alleged that the woman could not make
decisions about her property or personal needs, including
health care decisions. At the beginning of each visit, the
APS psychiatrist allegedly obtained the woman's consent
to meet. The discussion leading to the patient's "consent"
was brief and the psychiatrist did not advise her that the
information he was gathering might be used in a guardian-
ship petition and at a hearing. Although the APS psychia-
trist testified that the person was incapacitated and needed
a guardian, the petition was dismissed because the court
found that the person had the capacity to execute advance
directives and had an adequate informal support system.
The testimony of the psychiatrist was permitted and the
psychiatric affidavit remained part of the public record.
a A hospital filed a petition for a guardian to be
appointed for a man in his 60s who was brought to the hos-
pital by his family when he became disoriented while shop-
ping at a local supermarket. In support of the petition, the
hospital included medical information relating to alleged
psychiatric issues and substance abuse. The hospital also
alleged that the person could not be safely discharged to
his home and asked for a guardian with the power to sell
his residence in the community and place him permanently
in a nursing home. The court found the person had the
capacity to consent to the appointment of a guardian, but
only with limited powers for a limited period of time, and
required that the guardian facilitate a discharge back to his
home in the community with appropriate home care and
case management.
* A nursing home filed a petition to have a guardian
appointed for a woman in her 80s who had been living
at home in an apartment. After a mild stroke required the
woman's hospitalization and rehabilitation in a nursing
home, the petitioner alleged that the woman needed a
guardian due to her dementia and psychiatric issues. The
petition asked that the guardian be granted the power to
relinquish the AIP's apartment and keep her in the nursing
home. The court appointed a guardian with the power to
release the person's apartment and place her permanently
in the nursing home.
* A parent filed a petition to be appointed guardian for
his 21-year-old daughter, whose struggles with psychiatric
issues required her to reside in a residential school. The
school provided medical information that was used to
support the petition, and the daughter's psychiatrist sub-
mitted an affidavit that was attached to the petition. The
petition requested a guardianship with full powers and for
an unlimited duration. Although the daughter's functional
capacity was relatively high and she may have been able
to function independently over time, the court appointed
the parent as guardian with broad powers for an unlimited
duration.
These cases represent a microcosm of those decided
pursuant to Article 81 of the MHL. This statute, which
was enacted in 1983, has been justifiably lauded as a pio-
neering piece of legislation because it moved the focus
of the need for a guardian from a medical model to a
functional model and looks at the capacity of the person
to make decisions and perform activities of daily living.6
The adult guardianship population in New York and
the United States is rapidly becoming more diverse, and
demographic patterns point to substantial increases in
the number of people who may need a guardian due to
mental health issues, age-related diseases that affect cogni-
tion (e.g., Alzheimer's disease and other dementia-related
conditions), mental illness, and/or developmental disabili-
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m
ties. 7 The case vignettes described above reflect this diver-
sity. Petitioners can include government agencies, hospi-
tals, nursing homes, or family members - and the statute
also authorizes any other person or entity concerned with
the welfare of the person alleged to need a guardian to file
a petition. Those people alleged to need a guardian repre-
sent a diverse group: the elderly woman, who became the
subject of an APS investigation, who had an adequate sup-
port system in place; the older person who had a history of
financial problems and substance abuse being forced out of
his residence and into a nursing home; the elderly woman
whose guardian was authorized to release her apartment
and place her in a nursing home; and the young adult who
appointment of a guardian is clear and convincing evi-
dence. The pleadings must include a plain-English notice
to the AlP; the court must hold a hearing at which the
AlP must be present, unless the court dispenses with this
requirement; and the court must appoint a court evalua-
tor or an attorney for the AlP. The rules of evidence apply
in contested hearings. Courts are required to consider
alternatives to a guardianship before appointing a guard-
ian. The statute requires particular findings of fact and
provides for a variety of arrangements that include limited
guardianships - both in scope and duration.11
Yet, even under Article 81, routine disclosures of
medical information create a dual risk. One is that a
The concept of the least restrictive alternative is central
to the rights of people who are subjected to guardianship
proceedings; it is codified in Article 81.
suffered from mental disease and a lack of maturity. The
reasons for bringing a guardianship proceeding are also
illustrative: protection against possible financial exploita-
tion; discharge to a nursing home; sale of a residence in the
community and permanent placement in a nursing home,
and assurance that a parent would have legal authority to
make all major decisions for a child beyond the age of 21.
Despite their variety, these cases have two commonalities:
(1) medical information was included as part of the peti-
tion and used in ways that violated the medical privacy
of the person alleged to need a guardian, and (2) all of the
cases could have been resolved without filing a petition for
guardianship.
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been paid
to the "back end" of guardianships. 8 This phase of a
guardianship relates primarily to the duties of a guard-
ian, the duration of the guardianship, and the filing of
initial, annual and final reports which are reviewed by
court examiners and approved by the guardianship part
or court. In addition, judicial oversight is crucial to assure
that the powers being exercised remain appropriate and
necessary, and that the person is residing in the least
restrictive setting reasonable under the circumstances.9
However, relatively less attention has been paid to
issues at the "front end" of guardianships, which is the
point at which unnecessary guardianships can be avoid-
ed.10 These issues include the standard for appointing a
guardian, pleading requirements, possible alternatives
to a guardianship, the nature and quality of notice to the
Alp and interested parties, circumstances under which an
attorney must be appointed, the scope of the court evalu-
ator's role, and the use of medical information to support
a petition to appoint a guardian - whether in the form of
medical affidavits, records, or testimony.
Article 81 is a functional statute that includes impor-
tant components of due process. The standard for the
person's medical privacy will be violated, and the other
is that the statutory mandate to view the case through
a functional and least-restrictive-means framework will
be subordinated to a medical diagnosis. These violations
may occur throughout the various phases of a guardian-
ship case, including the "front end" in pleadings, during
the pre-hearing investigation stage when the parties pre-
pare their evidence, and while the neutral court evaluator
assesses the allegations and prepares recommendations
to the court. These violations may continue at the hear-
ing and, if a guardian is appointed, throughout the "back
end" of the guardianship, in the guardian's initial and
annual reports. These violations may be relatively benign
and in reality few people may see, know, or care about
the private medical information that remains in court
fies and digital records for many years. But the failure
to adequately safeguard and protect private medical and
health care related information might not only violate the
dignity and privacy rights of the Alp but also result in a
guardianship that is unnecessary.
The question is not whether medical evidence should
ever be part of a guardianship case. Indeed, if it is rel-
evant, probative, material, and admissible, then it may
very well help a judge, and possibly a jury, make a deci-
sion. Rather, the real questions concern whether there are
sufficient safeguards to prevent violations of a person's
medical privacy rights and under what circumstances, if
any, should medical information be disclosed and admit-
ted into evidence during the various phases of an Article
81 guardianship. In addition to violating a person's medi-
cal privacy rights, the loose use of medical information
may help perpetuate vestiges of the medical model of
guardianship, which has been repudiated over the course
of the last quarter century in numerous reports and stud-
ies. 12 Medical information and diagnosis may potentially
be detrimental to the person alleged to need a guardian
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in that it may enable a petitioner (and the court) to rel-
egate a functional assessment and potential alternatives
to a guardianship 13 to a secondary consideration. Thus,
health care facilities (i.e., hospitals and nursing homes)
and government agencies (i.e., APS) may file a guardian-
ship proceeding instead of exploring meaningful support
services, such as case management and discharge plan-
ning, resulting in unnecessary guardianships that further
strain the resources of the guardianship system.14
In addition, and perhaps more important, to have a
guardian appointed to make decisions is to experience
a "civil death." It deprives a person of the fundamental
rights that define our personhood. It deprives a person of
the right to forge an individual path in the world, how-
ever flawed and imperfect, as part of a larger community.
It is those precious and fundamental rights that are essen-
tial for human growth and development.
The Tension Between Functional
and Medical Evidence
Guardianship deprives a person of fundamental liber-
ties that are protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 5 The
United Nations Convention and Optional Protocol on
the Rights of Persons With Disabilities (UN Convention)
also includes far-reaching provisions and a framework
for protecting fundamental human rights for people with
disabilities.16 A guardianship should be used only as a
last resort when less restrictive alternatives have been
exhausted. If a court decides that a guardian is neces-
sary, the U.S. Constitution and Article 81 require that the
guardian be granted only the minimum powers that are
necessary. Article 81 provides for an array of due process
protections, including:
" detailed notice and pleading requirements;
" a functional framework that does not require medi-
cal information;
" the appointment of a neutral court evaluator or
attorney for the person, in every case;
* consideration of less restrictive alternatives to a
guardianship;
" a mandatory hearing;
" the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination; 17
" clear and convincing evidence of the need for a
guardian and the person's consent or incapacity;
* required findings of fact; and
" tailored guardianships that are monitored after 90
days and annually.
The concept of the least restrictive alternative is cen-
tral to the rights of people who are subjected to guardian-
ship proceedings; it is codified in the opening legislative
findings and purpose section of Article 81:
The legislature finds that it is desirable for and benefi-
cial to persons with incapacities to make available to
them the least restrictive form of intervention which
assists them in meeting their needs but, at the same
time, permits them to exercise the independence and
self-determination of which they are capable ... in a
manner tailored to the individual needs of that person,
which takes in account the personal wishes, prefer-
ences and desires of the person, and which affords the
person the greatest amount of independence and self-
determination and participation in all the decisions
affecting such person's life.18
The stakes of a guardianship proceeding are extremely
high. The outcome of a guardianship directly affects the
AIP's right to make decisions about fundamental aspects
of life such as where to live,' 9 health care and medical
treatment,20 social environment, 21 and management of
finances and property.22 The right to live independently,
with appropriate support, is essential for a person to
be fully recognized as such under the law. In Article 81
cases, the question often arises whether a person should
continue living at home in the community, return to a
community residence from a hospital or nursing facil-
ity, or continue to reside in a health care facility or other
institutional setting. Article 81 mandates that a person
under a guardianship be given the opportunity to remain
living in, or return to, the community provided it is rea-
sonable.23
The right of people with disabilities to live inde-
pendently in the community was recognized by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring.24
In Olmstead, the Court held that under the Americans
With Disabilities Act (ADA), individuals with disabilities
have a right to "the benefits of community living" if the
placement is appropriate, it is not opposed by the "affect-
ed" individual, and the placement could be reasonably
accommodated without a fundamental altering of the
program providing the services.25 Under the ADA, the
segregation of individuals with disabilities within institu-
tions constitutes discrimination, and the ADA's "integra-
tion regulation" requires reasonable accommodations in
a community-based setting.26
The right to independent living under Article 19 ("Inde-
pendent living and being included in the community")
is also a key provision of the UN Convention. The UN
Convention focuses on a person's legal capacity and rejects
substitute decision making and guardianship in favor of a
support model of decision making. 27 There is a symbiotic
relationship under the UN Convention between the Article
19 mandate for independent living and Article 12, which
provides that persons with disabilities shall have equal
recognition before the law and be entitled to the support
necessary to "exercise legal capacity."28
The standard for appointing a guardian has evolved
along with societal notions of incapacity, the under-
standing that disability is as much a social construct as
a personal challenge, our knowledge that the capacity to
make decisions is local and not global, and the value we
place on autonomy over protection. The concept of dis-
ability has, and continues to be, defined under a variety
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of rubrics, not all of which are mutually exclusive. Medi-
cal, legal, and functional needs are all accepted "prisms"
through which a person's capabilities can be assessed.
The "support of legal capacity" model under Article 12 of
the UN Convention situates all people along a continuum
of support.29
The medical evidence dilemma reflects the tension
between autonomy and protection that is at the core
of guardianship cases and also illuminates the larger,
evolving movement away from a medical model to a
functional framework, which may ultimately culminate
in the support model envisioned by Article 12 of the UN
Convention. A requirement that medical evidence must
The functional capacity
framework of Article 81 looks
primarily at the person's
capacity to manage
activities of daily living.
be offered to establish incapacity or disability may violate
a person's civil rights and result in an erroneous deter-
mination that does not reflect the functional ability and
capacity of the person. In contrast, appointing a guardian
based merely on factual evidence that is anecdotal may
risk ignoring or minimizing medical conditions that are
causing the person's limitations and that might be tem-
porary or responsive to treatment.30
When the evidence presented to prove the need for a
guardian involves both a person's psychiatric condition
and history, two main problems arise. First, admission of
this evidence "[p]oses a significant risk of unfair preju-
dice to the plaintiff in light of the persistent and evasive
stigmatizing effects of psychiatric diagnoses."31 Second,
"[flact finders are likely to misuse psychiatric evidence,
particularly when offered through expert witnesses,
because they have few tools to independently evaluate
such evidence and thus may overvalue the significance
of psychiatric diagnoses for the resolution of factual ques-
tions." 32
The functional capacity framework of Article 81 looks
primarily at the person's capacity to manage activities
of daily living, including decisions about finances and
health care. The standard for appointing a guardian
under Article 81 has two essential components: The
guardianship must be necessary, and the person must
either consent or found to be "incapacitated." 33 A court
must not appoint a guardian if there are adequate alter-
natives that are less restrictive and adequately meet the
person's needs, which would make the guardianship
unnecessary.34 Under the statute, the term "incapaci-
tated" means the person (1) has limitations that interfere
with activities and decisions of daily living, (2) does not
understand the nature and consequences of his or her
limitations, and (3) is therefore at risk of harm.
Although Article 81 has many of the positive attri-
butes of the functional approach, the inappropriate use of
medical evidence creates the risk of violating the medical
privacy rights of the person alleged to need a guardian.
The consequences of these violations may depend in
large part on the context of the case and the circumstances
of the person. Greater awareness of medical privacy
would help Article 81 fully realize its stated intent to base
guardianship on a person's functional capacity and rein-
force respect for the complete legal recognition of each
person's rights, dignity, and legal capacity.
Protections Against Disclosure of Medical
Information That Affects the Guardianship Population
Privacy is of great value in our society, and medical pri-
vacy in particular enjoys multi-layered levels of protec-
tion under various laws that govern disclosure by health
care entities and individual providers. These include the
right to medical privacy, protection against disclosures
by entities under the federal Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the MHL, as well
as evidentiary privileges such as the physician-patient
privilege.35
Medical Privacy Rights Under the U.S. Constitution
and State Constitution Apply to Individuals
Alleged to Need a Guardian
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a right of
informational privacy under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.36
Two broad categories are recognized within the right to
privacy: the right to autonomy, which protects personal
choices from unwarranted interference from the govern-
ment; and the right to maintain the confidentiality of
private information.37 In Whalen v. Roe,38 the Court held
that although there was a constitutional right of privacy,
a computerized record of prescriptions for controlled
substances maintained by the State of New York did not
violate those rights, as it contained adequate protection
against disclosure and did not affect an individual's
decision to obtain a prescription.
Federal courts in the Second Circuit have held that
this constitutional right "[iun avoiding disclosure of
personal matters" applies to the medical information
of a person with HIV,3 9 a prisoner with HIV who is a
transsexual, 40 and a person with sickle-cell anemia.41
Although courts agree that determining if a person's
medical privacy rights have been violated under the
Constitution requires a case-by-case analysis, in Matson
v. Board of Education of the City School District of New
York,42 the Second Circuit held that the standard requires
that the person have a serious medical condition that, if
disclosed, would bring "opprobrium," such as disgrace,
discrimination, and intolerance.43 Matson involved a
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music teacher with fibromyalgia who was investigated
by the Board of Education of the City of New York
(BOE) for potential abuse of its sick leave policy. In the
course of its investigation, the BOE posted her condi-
tion on its website, and the New York Times ran an article
about her situation. The court held that her privacy
rights were not violated in that fibromyalgia was not
fatal, did not involve a psychiatric disorder, was not
the kind of condition that if disclosed would result in
societal stigma and discrimination, and that any adverse
consequences the teacher suffered were due to her abuse
of the sick leave policy, not her medical condition. The
dissent in Matson criticized the majority for impos-
ing an unduly restrictive standard, particularly in the
procedural posture of deciding a motion to dismiss the
complaint.44
Assuming a particular medical condition is suffi-
ciently serious and subject to societal discrimination, the
question of whether disclosure is reasonable requires
analysis of the government's interest in public health
and whether action was taken to minimize the disclo-
sure of private information.
Although not specifically mentioned in the New York
State Constitution, New York courts have held that the
scope of the right to privacy protected under the state
constitution is broader than the U.S. Constitution.45
The N.Y. Court of Appeals has not specifically ruled on
the question of disclosure of medical records, although
it has upheld the requirement under New York City
law that the name and address of a person obtaining
an abortion be included on the pregnancy termination
document filed with the Department of Health, as it
furthered a governmental interest in maternal health
and made it easier for government officials to retrieve a
person's health records. 46
Applying these standards to guardianship cases,
the requirement that a condition be "serious" would
appear to be satisfied if a case involved the disclosure of
medical information supporting a finding of incapacity
and that a guardianship was necessary. To the extent
that particular medical conditions relate to a person's
mental capacity to make decisions, disclosure could
trigger the required level of disgrace, discrimination,
and intolerance required by Matson. For example, if a
medical affidavit accompanies a guardianship petition
and includes information related to a condition such as
Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease, or a history of
substance abuse, a person suffering from these poten-
tially disabling conditions is protected from discrimina-
tion under the ADA. Each of these is serious, potentially
fatal, and if revealed could subject a person to discrimi-
nation and intolerance. A person's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy should not diminish or disappear merely
because a government agency or health care facility files
a petition for guardianship, or a court decides the per-
son is incapacitated and appoints a guardian.
HIPAA and the MHL Limit the Circumstances
Under Which Covered Entities May Disclose
Protected Health Care Information in
Guardianship Proceedings
The release of medical records is subject to the require-
ments of HIPAA,4 7 which preempts state law unless the
state law provides greater privacy protection to health-
related information than HIPAA. For example, prior to
HIPAA, a person who brought a medical malpractice
action was deemed to have placed his or her medical
condition at issue, and therefore impliedly consented to
the disclosure of medical information to the defendant's
attorney. However, HIPAA's provisions require separate
authorization by the plaintiff before a defendant's attor-
ney is permitted to obtain protected health-related infor-
mation. Otherwise, the information is not admissible.
A patient or the patient's authorized representa-
tive (e.g., a person named in a HIPAA release, a court-
appointed guardian with the power to access health
care information, or an agent under a health care proxy)
must consent prior to the disclosure of medical records
by a covered entity under HIPAA.48 Exceptions to these
requirements include disclosures required by law, which
include but are not limited to requests made in the
course of a judicial proceeding. Such disclosure may be
in response to a subpoena, court order, or other process
related to the proceeding.49
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Although HIPAA includes a number of exceptions to
its general rule of non-disclosure, the failure to follow the
HIPAA procedures will result in the exclusion of the med-
ical records or information, and potentially a fine. The
N.Y. Court of Appeals has held that a hospital's release
of medical records to a state agency in an Assisted Out-
patient Treatment (AOT) proceeding pursuant to MHL §
9.60 (a.k.a. Kendra's Law) violated HIPAA, as the disclo-
sure was not authorized by the person who was the sub-
ject of the proceeding, and there was no judicial process
in the form of a court order or subpoena 50 In In re Miguel
M., the records provided to the AOT administrator did
not meet any of the exceptions recognized under HIPAA
- that is, for purposes of treatment or pursuant to a court
the theory that "privilege in the courtroom will encour-
age disclosure in the sickroom."54 The physician-patient
privilege protects information obtained by a physician
who attends to a person in his or her professional capac-
ity, whether the information is communicated to the
physician or based on the physician's observations.5 5 A
physician-patient relationship is created when profes-
sional services are rendered and accepted by the patient
pursuant to an express or implied contract.5 6 The privi-
lege applies regardless of whether the information is in
the form of testimony or record.5 7 And it is construed
broadly, although there are exceptions for review of
records by a court evaluator in an Article 81 case,5 8 exami-
nations related to employment (unless the physician
When the petitioner is a hospital, nursing home, or other
covered entity, the practice of including medical information
as part of the petition violates HIPAA.
order or other judicial or administrative process. The
Court also held that the AOT program did not fall within
the public health exception under HIPAA and the Privacy
Rule, and moreover, that the records were not admissible,
distinguishing the AOT context from a criminal context in
which courts have admitted medical records to prove that
a crime has been committed. In a subsequent case with
virtually identical facts, a lower court held that Miguel
M. applied retroactively, ruling that the medical records
at issue were not admissible since they were disclosed
without the patient's consent and without a court order
or subpoena.5 '
Under Article 81, health care facilities that initiate
guardianship proceedings routinely disclose medical
information without the consent of the patient or an
authorized representative. Such disclosure may occur at
the very beginning stage of a guardianship proceeding,
with the filing of the petition, in which case, the disclosure
often continues throughout all stages of the guardianship.
All the while, sensitive health care information is disclosed
freely, without the AlP's consent or a court order.
Evidentiary Privileges Protect Disclosure and
Admission of Medical Evidence in Guardianship
Proceedings
Evidentiary privileges govern the relationship between
a health care professional (and other disciplines such as
social workers) and a patient/client/consumer.5 2 The
physician-patient privilege did not exist at common law
and New York was the first jurisdiction to enact a physi-
cian-patient statutory privilege in 1828. Although subject
to some criticism, this privilege is firmly embedded in
the public policy of New York.53 The privilege safeguards
disclosures by individual providers and entities under
affirmatively treats or recommends treatment),5 9 cases
involving guardianship or custody of abused or destitute
children, reports made concerning suspected abuse and
neglect of children, where the physical and mental condi-
tion of a decedent is at issue, and for certain public health
purposes.60
The privilege is not waived merely because a person
has to defend against an action that places his or her
medical or psychiatric condition at issue, even if the
plaintiff or petitioner claims that the person's medical
condition is "in controversy" and subject to discovery.61
This applies directly to Article 81 guardianships, where a
person who is alleged to need a guardian is not making
a claim or putting his or her medical condition at issue,
at least initially, but is defending allegations made in the
petition by a government agency, health care facility, per-
son, or other entity.
Typically, a person who is alleged to need a guardian
may interact with a variety of physicians and other health
care professionals who initiate contact with the person in
a therapeutic context and may be subject to an eviden-
tiary privilege. This sort of involuntary physician-patient
relationship can pose special challenges in a guardian-
ship, as it may not fit neatly within the traditional concep-
tion of a treating physician.
The Use and Abuse of Medical Information in
Guardianship Proceedings: A Double-Edged Sword
The disclosure of medical information in a guardianship
case creates a risk that the person's medical privacy rights
will be violated and the health-related information will
be admitted into evidence that may not be causally con-
nected to the person's functional capacity and might dis-
tort the need for a guardian based on a medical diagnosis.
40 1 January 2013 1 NYSBA Journal
Conversely, the use of medical evidence and testimony in
guardianships may be necessary to assure that any pos-
sible determination of incapacity is not the result of side
effects from medication, depression, or other conditions
that if properly treated will resolve the problems causing
the person's incapacity.62
Under Article 81, a guardian can be appointed only if
it is necessary and the person consents or is found to be
incapacitated.63 The element of necessity requires a find-
ing that the person is at risk of harm if a guardian is not
appointed. If alternatives to a guardian are available and
sufficient, the guardianship may not be necessary, and
the petition must be dismissed.64 The secondary element
of either consent or a finding of incapacity requires that
the person either have the capacity to make an informed
decision about the nature and consequences of having a
guardian appointed or be found incapacitated. Incapacity
is defined as a person's lack of awareness and under-
standing of how limitations that interfere with decisions
about property and personal needs may put the person
at risk of harm.65 Notably, a finding of incapacity cannot
be based, for instance, on inability to pay rent or provide
for one's needs, or the questionable wisdom or even self-
destructive nature of "bad" decisions. Rather, it must be
based on the absence of a knowing or informed choice
about the decisions that may lead to harmful consequenc-
es.66 If a court finds that a guardianship is not necessary
- e.g., if adequate alternatives exist or the person is not at
risk of harm - the petition must be dismissed, even if the
person is found to be incapacitated.
Article 81 requires that certain information be includ-
ed in the petition, such as a "description of the [AIP's]
functional level, including [the AIP's] ability to manage
the activities of daily living, behavior, and understanding
and appreciation of the nature and consequences of any
inability to manage the activities of daily living."6 7 Wit-
nesses may be family members or friends, professionals
that have come into contact with the person or health care
personnel who may base their assessment on a medical
diagnosis. Although this evidence can and should pri-
marily be factual and anecdotal, medical information and
diagnoses continue to have a significant, if not primary,
role in Article 81 cases. However, medical evidence is not
required, either as part of the petition or at the hearing.6 8
The use of medical evidence depends in large part
on the context, the reasons for its use, and the role of the
person requesting access to those records. In an uncon-
tested proceeding, courts may have the discretion to relax
evidentiary rules, although that may still be problematic
in that the privacy rights of a person may be violated.
In a contested guardianship hearing, the full panoply
of objections and evidentiary requirements apply, and
courts will deny motions to admit medical records and
testimony into evidence. 69 In some cases, a court will
order that the hearing be closed to the public and the case
record sealed. 70
Using Protected Medical Information in Support
of the Petition May Violate HIPAA, the Physician-
Patient Privilege, and Distort the Focus on Functional
Capacity and the Least Restrictive Alternative
There is risk that the privacy rights of the AIP may be
violated when the order to show cause and petition are
filed. The petitioner may be a hospital or nursing home,
and the petition may contain the AIP's medical infor-
mation obtained from the facility's medical records or
records of treating physicians at the facility. Although
Article 81 explicitly states that medical information is
not required to be included in the petition, the order
to show cause must inform the person that the court
evaluator may request a court order to inspect medical
or psychiatric records and that the AIP has the right to
object to this request.71 In this very common scenario, a
court may strike a medical affidavit attached to the peti-
tion because it violates a person's medical privacy rights
under HIPAA, the physician-patient privilege, or other
applicable privacy laws.
When the petitioner is a hospital, nursing home, or
other covered entity, the practice of including medical
information as part of the petition violates HIPAA. 72 In
In re Derek,73 a case decided under Article 17-A of the
Surrogate's Court Procedure Act but directly applicable
to Article 81, the court removed medical affidavits that
were attached to the petition, as required by the statute.
The court held that the affidavits violated HIPAA but
denied the motion to dismiss as there was sufficient non-
privileged information to state a cause of action.
If medical information from a treating physician is
included as part of the petition, it may also violate the
physician-patient privilege. 74 Even when the purpose of
the petition is to secure an appropriate placement for a
patient in a facility, medical records and the testimony
of treating physicians are not admissible.75 In Tara X, 76 a
contested adversarial proceeding in which the privilege
had been asserted, a daughter alleged in the Article 81
petition that her mother had various psychiatric condi-
tions that made her incapacitated. She attached affida-
vits from a physician who had treated her mother dur-
ing a prior hospitalization, and reports of "medical per-
sonnel" who had "attended" to the mother prior to that
hospitalization. The court evaluator requested access to
the AIP's medical records and permission to retain an
independent physician to consult. The respondent AIP
asked the court for a protective order to prevent admis-
sion of the medical records and also opposed the request
of the court evaluator.
The court referred to the strong public policy in New
York, which supports the physician-patient privilege,
noting that the purpose is "[t]o encourage its citizenry
to seek medical treatment for any physical or mental
condition without fear of the public ridicule or disgrace
that might result from a disclosure of any such condi-
tion."77 Although the privilege is not absolute, there are
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very limited exceptions, including the use of medical
records by a court evaluator in guardianship matters to
assist in the investigation of the case as well as potential
disclosure under some circumstances.
The court in Tara X denied a motion by the court evalu-
ator to discover medical records because it would reduce
due process protection for the ALP to a level below that of
other civil litigants and ordered that medical information
attached to the petition be removed and sealed. The hold-
ing in Tara X affirmed the vitality of the physician-patient
privilege and the duty of the court to honor the privilege.
A petitioner who seeks disclosure of medical records
by subpoena subsequent to filing the petition implicates
a variety of protections against disclosure of medical
information. In granting a motion to quash the subpoena
served on a local agency of NYSARC Inc., the court
noted that this was a case of first impression. As the New
York State Office of People with Developmental Dis-
abilities certified the local agency, the records were pro-
tected under MFIL § 33.13. As a covered entity, the local
ARC agency was subject to HIPAA, which requires that
medical records be held confidential unless the patient
consents to or a court orders disclosure. The court also
held that the records were protected under the physician-
patient privilege. Notably, the court emphasized that
medical evidence is not required in an Article 81 proceed-
ing, and there was ample non-privileged information to
prove the need for a guardian.78
Using medical information in the petition potentially
violates laws protecting medical privacy and may also
have the effect of allowing the petitioner to minimize
or ignore the statutory requirement to provide informa-
tion about the person's functional capacity and to fully
explore whether alternatives to a guardianship are avail-
able. 79 In turn, this frames the guardianship in terms
of medical diagnosis, enabling the petitioner to avoid
taking responsibility for meaningful discharge planning
or a case management plan that meets the needs of the
person, without the appointment of a guardian. Even if
a guardianship is necessary, medical information substi-
tutes for a description of the person's capacity to perform
activities of daily living and make decisions. Instead of
guardianship being a last resort, it becomes a means for
providing case management and discharge planning,
often to the detriment of the person.
Disclosure of Medical Records to the Neutral
Court-Appointed Investigator. A Sound Practice
That Balances the Need for Relevant Information
and Privacy Concerns
Under Article 81, the court evaluator plays a pivotal role
in the proceeding and has broad-ranging powers, includ-
ing the duty to protect the property and interests of the
person alleged to need a guardian.80 As the neutral "eyes
and ears" of the court, the court evaluator is in a unique
position to shape how the case unfolds. It is critical that
the court evaluator attempt to limit unnecessary disclo-
sures of medical information, fully explore the availabil-
ity of less restrictive alternatives, promote the use of evi-
dence related to functional capacity and, if it is necessary
to appoint a guardian, recommend that the court grant
only those powers that are necessary and appropriate.
Article 81 strikes a balance between the court evalu-
ator's possible need to review medical records and the
importance of protecting the medical privacy rights of
the person alleged to need a guardian.81 A court evalua-
tor may request a court order to review medical records,
and if the court issues an order, it is only for the limited
purpose of assisting the court evaluator in his or her
investigation. 82 The court may order the disclosure of
these records to the court evaluator, notwithstanding
the physician-patient privilege, the psychologist-patient
privilege, or the social worker-client privilege provisions
of the CPLR.83 However, the authority of the court may
be limited by federal and state laws that impose different
standards for the disclosure of particular kinds of records,
such as records of patients in alcoholism and substance
abuse facilities, HIV-related information, and records of
patients in mental hygiene facilities.
Article 81 draws an important distinction between the
use of medical records to assist the court evaluator and
their admissibility as evidence in court.84 This recognizes
that while medical records might be helpful in a court
evaluator's assessment, they are not always essential and
should not be disclosed unnecessarily or automatically
be deemed admissible. The court evaluator should ini-
tially only disclose relevant records to the court in-camera.
Unless the court directs otherwise, the court evaluator
should discuss medical-specific diagnoses and medications
only in a separate addendum to the court evaluator report.
If the court orders that medical records be disclosed
to the court evaluator, the court may also direct such fur-
ther disclosure of those records upon the request of the
petitioner or the attorney for the person alleged to need a
guardian.85 This disclosure may be limited to pre-hearing
discovery, as with Article 31 of the CPLR, or extend to
admission as evidence at the hearing.86 Although the
court evaluator's report may be admitted into evidence
if the court evaluator is subject to cross examination, that
does not mean medical records and information obtained
by the court evaluator are similarly admissible.87 The
court evaluator can apply to the court to retain an
independent medical expert where it is necessary and
appropriate, 88 which may be necessary in order to avoid
a breach of the AIP's physician-patient privilege. If insuf-
ficient medical information is available and the court
evaluator needs that information, an independent medi-
cal expert may help determine if the AIP is incapacitated.
A court may deny a request by the court evaluator for an
order that grants access to medical records on the basis
that it would deny the AIP constitutionally protected due
process rights.89
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The court is also authorized, in uncontested proceed-
ings and for good cause shown, to relax the rules of evi-
dence. This discretion, as noted by the court in Tara X,
reflects the balance between the more traditional "best
interests" approach to guardianship and the "adver-
sarial" approach embodied in modem guardianship
statutes that provide enhanced protection of the rights
of the person alleged to be incapacitated. However,
relaxing the rules of evidence may create a potential
need a guardian has interacted with physicians and other
health care professionals who serve in a variety of roles.
The testimony of a non-treating physician is not subject
to the privilege and is admissible provided it is mate-
rial, relevant, and probative and not excludable on other
grounds. In In re Marie H.,96 a case involving a psychiatrist
who was part of a mobile emergency response team, the
AIP moved to strike the testimony of the psychiatrist on
the basis of the physician-patient privilege. The psychia-
Article 81 draws an important distinction between the
use of medical records to assist the court evaluator and their
admissibility as evidence in court.
problem for a person who needs, and does not object
to, a guardian. If the person has the capacity to consent
to the appointment of a guardian, a court may appoint
one based on a finding of necessity and consent. This
makes a finding of incapacity unnecessary and medical
evidence and testimony would not be required. Con-
cerns about medical privacy are equally present in an
uncontested proceeding, if private medical information
is part of the proceeding and remains in the court file as
a public record.
Testimony by Physicians and Other Health
Care Professionals to Support the Appointment
of a Guardian
The physician-patient privilege and other similar evi-
dentiary privileges apply in contested Article 81 cases.90
Under Article 81, medical testimony is not required in
all cases and may not be admissible unless the person
waives the physician-patient privilege or places his or
her medical condition at issue.91 For example, a person
placed her mental condition at issue when she included
a doctor's report in her motion to dismiss the Article
81 petition, notwithstanding her assertion that the sole
purpose of the report was to rebut the allegations of her
examining physician.92 A person does not waive the
physician-patient privilege by failing to object to the
testimony of a physician who treated the person in the
hospital if the physician relies on his or her notes and
not the person's medical records.93
If the privilege has not been waived, the testimony
of a treating physician should be excluded. 94 Functional
evidence alone can be sufficient to meet the statutory
standard for appointing a guardian. Even if the testi-
mony of the treating physician is not admissible, the
court may appoint a guardian based on the testimony
of, say, the person's children that their mother could not
manage her medical, personal, and financial needs.95
The traditional confines of the physician-patient
privilege may not adequately protect disclosures of
private medical information when the person alleged to
trist was acting pursuant to a statutory "Comprehensive
Psychiatric Emergency Program," which authorized par-
ticipating psychiatrists to involuntarily commit a person
who was found to need immediate care and treatment
and who posed a danger to herself or others due to a
psychiatric condition. The court analyzed the nature and
responsibilities of the psychiatrist's role and found that
it was closer to that of a police officer making an arrest
than a treating physician. This decision was supported by
statutes that created a relatively well-defined role for the
psychiatrist acting within the scope of emergency circum-
stances with specific protocols and remedies. The psy-
chiatrist was acting to protect the safety and well-being
of the person, serving as part of the rescue component of
a structured response that included treatment by other
psychiatrists and providers at the institution to which the
person was taken.
The Special Case of the APS Psychiatrist as
Investigator and Witness: A Treating Physician
Subject to Evidentiary Privilege or a "Guardianship
Specialist" Fulfilling the Agency's Protective
Function?
Federal law requires states to provide Adult Protective
Services.97 APS is generally responsible for providing
information, referrals, and assurance that services are
available to individuals who are unable to manage their
property or personal care. The agency works to provide
for vulnerable individuals' personal needs and protect
them from dangerous circumstances arising from neglect
or abuse, particularly those who have no one able or
willing to provide needed assistance.98 Adult protective
services have a legal duty to provide necessary care and
services to eligible adults.99
APS must provide an array of support services
designed to assist vulnerable adults who are at risk of
harm to remain in the community and avoid institution-
alization. Additionally, APS is required to prevent or
resolve cases of neglect, exploitation or abuse by enhanc-
ing the person's capacity to function independently. It
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may investigate allegations or provide services to a vul-
nerable person,1' ° and decide that it is necessary to file
a guardianship petition. When a psychiatrist employed
by APS is part of the investigation, roles may be blurred.
Information gathered from the AIP in an arguably thera-
peutic context may later be used as evidence in a guard-
ianship proceeding. The methods by which APS obtains
this information, and its use in guardianship cases, raises
issues related to medical privacy and the scope and appli-
cation of the physician-patient privilege.
Two significant practices involving APS raise seri-
ous concerns as to violations of the liberty interests and
medical privacy rights of vulnerable elders. When APS
is unable to gain access to a person, perhaps because
the person does not want to cooperate for fear of being
placed in an institution or having a guardian appointed,
APS may utilize an ex parte process that culminates in an
order granting access to the vulnerable elder's residence.
The purpose of this visit is ostensibly limited to assuring
that the person is not in danger. It is improper for APS to
use evidence obtained as part of this ex parte process in a
guardianship case.
In re Eugenia M.1o involved a 95-year-old woman
whose landlord contacted APS and reported inter alia that
her cooperative apartment was in need of repairs. A psy-
chiatrist for APS met with Ms. M in March 2007. In early
2008, the City of New York Department of Social Services,
the parent agency of APS, initiated an Article 81 guardian-
ship proceeding and a hearing was scheduled for February
8, 2008. Ms. M thought the hearing was scheduled for Feb-
ruary 6, in part because the return date was "faint" on the
order to show cause, and traveled to the courtroom alone
by public transportation, despite the winter cold.
The hearing was adjourned, and after several months,
the petitioner requested that the matter be further
adjourned as Ms. M refused to allow the APS caseworker
into her home. The additional adjournment would allow
APS to obtain an "Order to Gain Access" to Ms. M's
apartment, which in turn would allow the APS psy-
chiatrist to evaluate Ms. M. The court denied the request
because the Order to Gain Access is intended to be used
only to assess a person's need for protective services,
which APS had already done. It is also appropriate only if
there is no other opportunity to observe and evaluate the
person. Here, Ms. M left her apartment on a daily basis to
shop, which would afford APS a sufficient opportunity to
interact with her.
Ms. M's court-appointed attorney argued that APS was
using the adjournment and possible Order to Gain Access
as a pretext to gather additional evidence to support its
guardianship petition because the nine-month delay had
rendered APS's evidence stale. After the court denied the
motion for an adjournment, the petitioner commenced its
case with one witness, the APS psychiatrist, who testified
based on the single meeting with Ms. M. The psychiatrist
testified that Ms. M's apartment needed some repairs,
some of which had not been done because Ms. M report-
ed that she had previously been overcharged for repairs,
further noting that Ms. M had food in the refrigerator, her
grooming was "passable," and that she told him that she
paid her own bills, did her own banking, shopping, and
cooking, and had health insurance. The court dismissed
the petition, finding that the evidence established that
Ms. M's only functional limitation was an unsteady gait,
and that the threat of a future eviction did not support the
appointment of a guardian.
Outside the ex parte context, a similar practice that
raises medical privacy and evidentiary privilege con-
cerns is the use of APS psychiatrists to obtain informa-
tion to be used in a guardianship petition. Usually, the
APS caseworker is familiar with the AIP, having worked
on his or her case. Next the APS psychiatrist becomes
the primary investigator, assesses the person's need for
guardianship, and ultimately becomes the primary wit-
ness for the petitioner. The APS petition will routinely
recite that the person voluntarily consented to be inter-
viewed by the psychiatrist. Ironically, the information
obtained from the voluntary interview becomes the
basis of the psychiatrist's testimony that the person who
provided "informed consent" needs a guardian with
broad powers, including those related to medical and
health care decisions. A person may have the capacity
to consent to a meeting with an APS psychiatrist but
not have the capacity to make decisions about property
management and personal care, but the nature of con-
sent is actually fairly complex. This casts doubt as to
whether such consent is truly informed, knowing, and
voluntary.
As a threshold matter, it is doubtful that the psychia-
trist provides sufficient information to the AIP for the
AIP to form the predicate for an informed decision. The
psychiatrist is employed by APS, and APS is charged
with protecting those in need, including diagnosing and
improving their circumstances. The psychiatrist will not
only perform an assessment and evaluation for those
purposes, but the information obtained may also be the
basis for bringing a guardianship proceeding, in part for
precisely those decisions relating to the informed consent
that the APS psychiatrist is trying to obtain. Even if the
APS psychiatrist does provide that information, a truly
informed consent would require that the person under-
stands the role of the psychiatrist within APS, the man-
date of APS, and the nature and scope of a guardianship
proceeding. 102
The extent to which the APS practice of using a psy-
chiatrist as a "guardianship specialist" violates medical
privacy depends, at least in part, on a number of factors.
Assuming there is a constitutional right of medical privacy,
does the person have a reasonable expectation of privacy
when meeting with an APS psychiatrist in an arguably
therapeutic context? Can the APS psychiatrist be charac-
terized as a "treating physician" subject to the physician-
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patient evidentiary privilege or, alternatively, does the
psychiatrist owe a duty of confidentiality to the person?
Generally, the existence of a privilege favors the
"exclusion of the evidence." 10 3 "[TIhe decision as to what
values to recognize through the law of privileges is a dif-
ficult one." 104 Conventional wisdom holds that due to
the narrow scope of the physician-patient privilege, the
APS psychiatrist is an "examining" physician to whom
the privilege does not apply. However, a closer examina-
tion of the APS mandate suggests that the role of the APS
psychiatrist may be within the scope of the evidentiary
privilege that attaches to treating physicians. Consider
the following characterization of the APS role:
The Commissioner is likewise charged with arranging
for medical and psychiatric services to evaluate and
whenever possible to safeguard and improve the cir-
cumstances of adults with serious impairments.105
The psychiatrist "visiting" Ms. M on behalf of APS
was charged with carrying out the APS mandate to
evaluate, safeguard, and improve Ms. M's circumstances.
A treating physician is defined as one who provides
diagnosis or medical treatment pursuant to an explicit
or implicit agreement. 10 6 Although the APS psychiatrist
is not providing services under a standing order from a
physician, pursuant to the agency's statutory mandate,
the psychiatrist is both diagnosing and attempting to
remediate the person's medical condition. Although APS
is required to conduct an investigation upon receiving a
report of a vulnerable person at risk, in the guardianship
context, the psychiatrist often, if not always, seeks to
obtain consent to meet with the person.
It is therefore arguable that the APS psychiatrist
should honor the person's expectations of privacy and
also be subject to the physician-patient privilege, at least
to the extent that the psychiatrist is involved in diag-
nosis and any kind of therapeutic relationship. Unlike
a personal injury case, in the context of a guardianship
proceeding, the person alleged to be incapacitated is not
placing her own medical condition at issue. The case is
brought "against" the person, and the petitioning party
in New York has the burden of proving that the guard-
ianship is necessary and the person either consents or
is incapacitated as defined by the statute. A distinction
between the APS psychiatrist's interaction with a poten-
tial AIP and a more conventional relationship between a
psychotherapist and patient is that, typically, a conven-
tional patient consults the psychotherapist for diagnosis
and treatment, whereas APS initiates contact with an AIP
pursuant to a statutory mandate.107
The privilege that attaches to communications between
patient and physician or psychiatrist is subject to a number
of exceptions, including when it occurs for reasons other
than treatment.10 8 The intended protective function of APS
may require that a petition for guardianship be filed if the
person is having difficulty providing for his or her needs,
although guardianship should be only a last resort after
sufficient efforts have been made to provide necessary
services to the person. The purpose of the guardianship
would ostensibly be to prevent harm to the vulnerable
person and assure that he or she receives and continues to
receive sufficient services. Assuming that alternatives to
a guardianship have been fully explored, but to no avail,
these arguments would support the view that the APS psy-
chiatrist is not subject to the physician-patient privilege.
Yet there remains something quite troubling about this
relationship and the medical professional's use of infor-
mation obtained during the course of the APS investiga-
tion. Under Article 81, medical evidence is not necessary,
and non-privileged evidence that is relevant and material
to a person's functional capacity and the standard for
appointing a guardian is sufficient and favored by the
statute. The rationale for using a psychiatrist to obtain
information for APS is therefore weaker, and at least
requires that diagnostic and other medical information
obtained by the psychiatrist be excluded. A better alter-
native would be to rely on testimony from the APS case-
worker regarding the AIP's functional capacity.
Recommendations to Prevent, Manage,
and Resolve Violations of Medical Privacy
in Article 81 Guardianships
Although Article 81 is a "functional capacity" statute,
it falls short of the emerging support model envisioned
by Article 12 of the UN Convention that recognizes a
person's full legal capacity regardless of disability. The
support model would replace the guardianship incapac-
ity framework with a "co" or "facilitated" structure for
supportive decision making. Article 81 includes many
provisions that respect a person's autonomy and protect
due process, privacy, and liberty interests that are at
stake for individuals who are alleged to need a guardian.
However, the permissive use of medical information per-
petuates the medical model of guardianship and creates
the risk that medical privacy rights are routinely violated.
Consequently, it may also impede a full exploration of
functional capacity and alternatives to guardianship.
The following recommendations are intended to
improve Article 81 through a combination of proposed
amendments and suggested "best practices." The ulti-
mate goal of these recommendations is to move Article
81 closer toward a completely functional framework that
utilizes a support model, which ultimately will replace
the notion of incapacity and guardianship with the model
of "partnered" or "facilitated" decision making required
under Article 12 of the UN Convention.
1. Prior to filing an Order to Show Cause and Petition,
attorneys for petitioners should conduct a complete
investigation in order to fully assess the person's
functional capacity and determine whether alterna-
tives to a guardianship are available and sufficient.
They should thoroughly assess the need for a guard-
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ian and determine to the greatest extent possible if
the person has the capacity to make decisions. This
assessment should focus on the statutory standard,
explore potential alternatives to a guardianship,
highlight the person's functional abilities rather than
medical diagnoses, and use the statutory powers as a
checklist.109
2. When drafting the petition, the attorney for the
petitioner should include as much of the statutorily
required information as possible. Under § 81.08(a),
the petition is supposed to include specific informa-
tion, including the following most relevant to these
recommendations:
" Describe the person's functional capacity based on
his or her ability to manage activities of daily living.
* Include specific information about events, actions,
or occurrences that create a risk of harm, and indi-
cate that the person does not appreciate or under-
stand the limitations that interfere with his or her
ability to provide for personal needs or property
management. 110
" Explicitly connect the person's needs and func-
tional capacities to the powers sought."'
" Identify and describe resources that may be avail-
able as alternatives to the guardianship. 112 If
none exist, describe specific actions taken by the
petitioner that would constitute due diligence in
exploring these potential alternatives.
" Include any other information that would help
the court evaluator.1 3 This existing statutory
requirement implicitly requires that the petition-
er view the petition from the perspective of the
court evaluator, at least with respect to making
sure that a guardianship is necessary and there
are no sufficiently reliable alternatives available.
* Do not include medical information without a
court order. Medical information is not required to
be included with the petition. The statute's empha-
sis on functional capacity and medical privacy
protections suggest, and may require, that medical
information not be included with the petition.
3. Suggested "best practices" for judges:
" Do not sign the Order to Show Cause if the peti-
tion does not include the required elements
described above.
" Prior to accepting a petition that includes pro-
tected or privileged medical information, require
the petitioner's attorney to submit an affirma-
tion explaining the need for medical information,
explain why evidence of functional capacity is
not available or sufficient, and formally request a
court order to include medical information with
the petition.
* As part of an order granting the request to use
medical information (whether made by the peti-
tioner or the court evaluator), require the protect-
ed or privileged information to be in a separate
document, perhaps as a "medical information
rider" to the petition, or an addendum to the
court evaluator report, so that it may easily be
separated and sealed from the publicly available
case documents.
* Exclude medical information and evidence from
the hearing, unless there is insufficient evidence
related to the person's functional capacity, or the
medical information is necessary and appropriate
in order to make the required findings and deci-
sions, assure that the person's medical diagnosis
and medication regimen is accurate and thera-
peutic, or for any other reason that would be
helpful to the court or to the person. The goal
is to more sharply focus the hearing on the
person's functional capacity, potential alterna-
tives to a guardianship, and the least restrictive
alternative.
9 Disseminate rules for court evaluators regard-
ing the use of medical information. These rules
would emphasize that the assessment is a func-
tional one and not a medical diagnosis. The rules
would also require a court order for the court
evaluator to obtain medical information and
disclose it to other parties. In addition, the court
evaluator would be permitted to include medical
diagnoses, medications, treatment, and other pro-
tected information only in a separate addendum
to the court evaluator report, unless otherwise
ordered by the court or the court record
is sealed.
4. A party seeking to introduce medical evidence that
may infringe on a person's medical privacy rights
should be required to make a proffer of necessity.
The court may either rule on the proffer as part of
a pre-hearing written motion or hear oral argument
on the issue prior to the hearing or on the
hearing date.
5. Require APS to focus more on functional capacity
in its guardianship assessment and petition process,
rather than basing its assessment, petition, and testi-
mony too much on medical diagnosis.
* Clarify the role of physicians, psychiatrists, psy-
chologists, and social workers employed by APS
who provide services to a person, and when
they are acting in their professional capacity as
an APS service provider, subject them to their
profession's evidentiary privileges. Prior to a
decision by the Department of Social Services or
other "parent" agency of APS to file a petition
for guardianship, these professionals should fol-
low a protocol to obtain informed consent, which
specifically states the purpose of the meeting
(i.e., Is it a therapeutic relationship that gives
rise to an evidentiary privilege or is the purpose
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to assess the person's capacity to determine
whether a guardianship is warranted?). If the
purpose is assessing the need for a guardian, and
the person does not fully understand the nature
and consequences of the consent, the APS profes-
sional must terminate the meeting and may not
gather information that may be used "against"
the person in a guardianship proceeding. The
goal would be to encourage these professionals
to work with the person to achieve the statutory
goals of APS, rather than gather evidence for a
guardianship case from an unsuspecting person
who is vulnerable and may not understand the
nature and consequences of the APS employee's
role. If the professional who may be subject to
an evidentiary privilege is assessing the need
for a guardian (i.e., acting as a "guardianship
specialist" rather than a medical, psychological,
or social work professional), the person should
be permitted to testify only in that capacity,
rather than as a professional who can diagnose
and opine as to appropriate treatment of the
person.
When an APS investigation involves an APS-
employed psychiatrist or other professional
who may potentially infringe on the person's
medical privacy or be subject to evidentiary
privileges, the professional must obtain mean-
ingful informed consent from the person. If the
professional does not believe that the person has
the capacity to understand the potential conse-
quences of providing information to the profes-
sional, no further discussion should be allowed.
If the psychiatrist or health care professional is
truly acting as a "guardianship specialist" for
APS rather than in his or her capacity as a medi-
cal professional, that person should be precluded
from testifying at the hearing as a medical expert
or about medical information. A better alterna-
tive would be to have APS fully explore services
that may avoid the need for a guardianship. If a
guardianship petition is filed as a last resort, APS
should have a caseworker, not a psychiatrist,
testify about the AIP's functional capacity.
6. Amend the last clause of § 81.07(b)(3), by replacing
"the court shall not require that supporting papers
contain medical information" with "the petition,
and any supporting papers, shall not include
medical information without a court order."
7. Amend Article 81 terminology generally to more
precisely reflect a focus on a person's legal capac-
ity, rather than her incapacity or deficiency." 4
Throughout the statute, replace the term "alleged
incapacitated person" with "person alleged to need
a guardian" and replace the term "incapacitated
person" with "person with a guardian."
Conclusion
Article 81 should continue moving toward becoming a
fully functional capacity statute that emphasizes func-
tional capacity, requires that alternatives to a guardian-
ship be fully explored prior to appointing a guardian,
and raises the threshold for including medical informa-
tion with the petition and at the hearing. If a court deter-
mines that medical evidence is necessary, there should
be uniform procedures to ensure that a person's medical
privacy rights are protected. Ultimately, both the medical
and functional models of guardianship based on a per-
son's incapacity should be replaced by a support model
that recognizes the full legal capacity of the person, and
identifies areas in which assistance is needed, without a
finding of incapacity. E
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